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The Right to Jury Trial in Insurance




Insurance coverage disputes are a common source of litigation in
California. If coverage under an insurance policy is questionable, in-
surance companies ordinarily provide their putative insured with a
conditional defense subject to a full reservation of rights to bring an
action for declaratory relief that seeks a judicial determination of non-
coverage.1 Although this procedure results in greater expense in the
form of defense costs to insurance companies, the current state of Cali-
fornia law concerning an insurer's duty to defend2 and its covenant of
good faith and fair dealing3 have forced insurance companies to take
this route to protect themselves from potential bad faith liability.
Therefore, when insurance coverage is questionable, two law suits are
often initiated involving the same parties and the same set of operative
facts.
The first action is one at law for damages; that is, the underlying
* B.A. 1970, University of California, Santa Barbara; J.D. 1974, Hastings College of Law,
University of California; Partner, Boiling, Walter and Gawthrop, Sacramento, California.
** B.A. 1979, University of California, Davis; Third Year Law Student, University of the
Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; Law Clerk, Boiling, Walter and Gawthrop.
1. See 18 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW, 322 (2d ed. 1959).
2. See generally Revere & Chapman, Insurers Duty to Defend, 13 PAC. L.J. 889 (1982).
3. See generally Alien, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Needfor Legislative Intervention, 13
PAc. L.J. 833 (1982).
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liability suit in which the insured is named as defendant. The second
action is one for declaratory relief initiated by the insurer that names
all the parties to the underlying liability suit as defendants. This multi-
plicity of suits serves only to overburden an already congested court
calendar. In addition, the increase in litigation costs incurred by insur-
ance companies in bringing insurance coverage declaratory relief ac-
tions manifests itself in higher operational costs which are ultimately
passed on to the consumer in the form of higher premiums. Therefore,
a solution to crowded calendars and high premiums should be favored
by both the legal profession and the consumer.
Before the legislature can remedy this problem by enacting appropri-
ate legislation, one hurdle must be overcome. If a party has the consti-
tutional right to a jury trial in insurance coverage declaratory relief
actions, 4 then any act by the legislature which infringes upon that right
is a nullity.' Therefore, it must be determined if a right to trial by jury
is preserved by the California Constitution in insurance coverage de-
claratory relief actions before the legislature is free to act.
The issue of whether the right to a jury trial exists in coverage dis-
putes between an insurer and its insured is not an easy one to decide.
Ordinarily, causes of action are clearly legal or non-legal in nature. As
discussed below, if the cause of action is legal in nature, deciding issues
cognizable at common law, then the right to a jury trial is protected by
the California Constitution.6 If, on the other hand, the cause of action
is non-legal in nature, cognizable in the courts of equity or admiralty
for example, then the right to a jury trial is not protected.7 The deter-
mination of the legal or non-legal nature of insurance coverage dis-
putes is complicated by the fact that the remedy sought, a declaration
of non-coverage, is neither traditionally legal nor equitable in nature.8
Declaratory relief is sui generis; a creature of statute which was un-
known to the common law.9 Therefore, with respect to insurance cov-
erage disputes at least, confusion abounds in the cases dealing with the
issue.
This article will attempt to show that the issue of whether a right to a
jury trial exists in insurance coverage declaratory relief actions has not
been adequately addressed by the California courts. The appellate de-
4. See CAL. CONST., art. 1, §16.
5. People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 287, 231 P.2d 832, 835 (1951);
People v. Kelly, 203 Cal. 128, 133, 263 P. 226, 228 (1928).
6. See text accompanying notes 12-70 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 12-70 infra.
8. See CoucH, supra, at 322.
9. Patterson v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 6 Cal. App. 3d 310, 315, 85 Cal. Rptr. 665, 667
(1970); Veale v. Piercy, 206 Cal. App. 2d 557, 560-61, 24 Cal. Rptr. 91, 93 (1962).
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cisions which have addressed the issue have not properly applied the
test articulated by the California Supreme Court. As explained below,
the determinative question to be answered in deciding this issue is
whether the English common law courts had jurisdiction over cases in-
volving insurance contracts at the time the California Constitution was
adopted in 1850.10 An historical inquiry will be made into the origin
and development of insurance in an attempt to answer this very ques-
tion. This article will show that the historical evidence suggests that the
English common law courts did not have proper jurisdiction over cases
involving insurance contracts at the time the California Constitution
was adopted. Therefore, the California Constitution does not preserve
a right to jury trial in insurance coverage disputes. 1 Moreover, the
legislature is free to enact legislation to relieve over-burdened court cal-
endars. Before the history of insurance is explored, this article will
briefly trace the development of California law concerning the right to
a jury trial.
THE RIGHT TO JURY UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW: AN
HISTORICAL APPROACH
Article I, Section 16, of the California Constitution provides that
"[t]rial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all. .. .12
Although the constitution clearly states that the right to a jury trial is a
sacred right, an inviolate right is not synonomous with an absolute
right. In other words, the inviolate right to a trial by jury is not without
its limitations. In general, a person only has a right to a jury trial when
the issues being litigated are legal in nature. If the issues are equitable
in nature, or non-legal, then no right to jury trial exists.
The leading case in California concerning the constitutional right to
a jury trial is People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe.13 The facts in One
Chevrolet concerned the seizure and attempted forfeiture of an auto-
mobile pursuant to a statute which provided that any vehicle used to
10. See text accompanying notes 20-26 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 72-187 infra.
12. The analagous counterpart in the United States Constitution is the seventh amendment
which reads in pertinent part:
"In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right
to trial by jury shall be preserved ...." Because the United States Supreme Court has not
incorporated the seventh amendment into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the several states may create or diminish the right to a jury trial in state civil actions free of the
seventh amendment's requirements. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937). For this
reason, federal decisions interpreting the seventh amendment right to a jury trial, although per-
suasive authority, are not binding on the states. This article will address only the right to a jury
trial in a civil action under state jurisdiction pursuant to the California Constitution, Article I,
Section 16.
13. 37 Cal. 2d 283, 231 P.2d 832 (1951).
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unlawfully transport any narcotic, or in which any narcotic is unlaw-
fully kept, deposited or concealed, or is unlawfully possessed by an oc-
cupant thereof, shall be forfeited to the State. 14 Other provisions of the
statute authorized any peace officer making a narcotics arrest to seize
any vehicle used in contravention of the statute and hold it as evidence
until a forfeiture has been declared or a release ordered."5 Additional
provisions provided for notice to owners, hearings, and for a judgment
of forfeiture or release.16 No provision of the statute provided for a
jury trial in the forfeiture proceedings.' 7 The legal owner and holder of
a chattel mortgage filed a demand for a jury trial which was eventually
disallowed by the trial court.' 8 In reversing the trial court's ruling dis-
allowing the legal owner's demand for a jury trial, the California
Supreme Court articulated the test to be applied by the courts in deter-
mining if a constitutional right to a jury trial exists.' 9
The court held that the constitutional right to a jury trial is the right
as it existed at common law at the time the California Constitution was
adopted.'0 Moreover, it was stated that the common law at the time the
constitution was adopted included not only decisional law, but also the
statutes of the British Parliament in effect on that date.2' In addition,
the court held that any act of the legislature attempting to abridge the
constitutional right to a jury trial was null and void.2 2 In emphasizing
the historical nature of the inquiry, the court explained:
It is the right to trial by jury as it existed at common law which is
preserved; and what that is, is a purely historical question, a fact
which is to be ascertained like any other social, political or legal fact.
The right is the historical right enjoyed at the time it was guaranteed
by the Constitution. It is necessary, therefore, to ascertain what was
the rule of the English common law upon this subject in 1850.23
A problem is created, however, when an action is brought pursuant
to a statutorily created cause of action unknown in the English com-
mon law. Like the forfeiture statute in One Chevrolet, the California
declaratory relief statute24 creates a cause of action unknown to the
English common law. Furthermore, the legislature did not specifically




18. Id at 285-86, 231 P.2d at 834.
19. Id
20. Id at 286-87, 231 P.2d at 835 (citing People v. Richardson, 138 Cal. App. 404, 408, 32
P.2d 433, 435 (1934)).
21. Id at 287, 231 P.2d at 835 (citing Moore v. Purse Seine Net, 18 CaL 2d 835, 838, 118 P.2d
1, 4 (1941)).
22. Id (citing People v. Kelly, 203 Cal. 128, 133, 263 P. 226, 228 (1928)).
23. Id at 287, 231 P.2d at 835.
24. CAL. Crw. PRoc. CODE §1060.
1982 / Right to Jury Trials
provide for the right to a jury trial in either the declaratory relief or
forfeiture statutes."
The problem of fitting a cause of action into an historical category,
either legal or equitable, was faced by the court in One Chevrolet where
it developed what is commonly referred to as the "gist of the action"
test:
The right to a trial by jury cannot be avoided by merely calling an
action a special proceeding or equitable in nature. If that could be
done, the Legislature, by providing new remedies and new judg-
ments and decrees in form equitable, could in all cases dispense with
jury trials, and thus entirely defeat the provision of the Constitution.
The Legislature cannot convert a legal right into an equitable one so
as to infringe upon the right of trial by jury. The provision of the
Constitution does not permit the Legislature to confer on the courts
the power of trying according to the course of chancery any question
which has always been triable according to the course of the common
law by jury. If the action has to deal with ordinary common-law
rights cognizable in courts of law, it is to that extent an action at law.
In determining whether the action was one triable by a jury at com-
mon law, the court is not bound by the form of the action but rather
by the nature of the rights involved and the facts of the particular
case--the gist of the action. A jury trial must be granted where the
gist of the action is legal, where the action is in reality cognizable at
law.
26
At one point in time, the California Supreme Court appeared to
abandon the historical approach set forth in One Chevrolet. In Raedeke
v. Gilbralter Savings and Loan Association, 7 plaintiffs sued (1) to set
aside a trustee's foreclosure sale of real property owned by them; (2) to
recover damages for conversion of personal property; (3) to recover
compensatory and punitive damages for fraud; and (4) to recover dam-
ages for breach of contract.2" To insure themselves of a trial by jury,
plaintiffs voluntarily abandoned their equitable claim to set aside the
trustee sale and eventually dismissed their fraud and breach of contract
claims. Plaintiffs used the factual allegations of their abandoned claim
to set aside the trustee sale to support a cause of action claim for dam-
ages for breach of Gilbralter's oral promise not to sell the property.29
In addition, plaintiffs retained their second cause of action for conver-
sion.30 Eventually, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs on both of
25. See 37 Cal. 2d at 286, 231 P.2d at 834; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1060.
26. 37 Cal. 2d at 299, 231 P.2d at 843-44 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
27. 10 Cal. 3d 665, 517 P.2d 1157, 111 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1974).
28. Id at 668, 517 P.2d at 1158, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
29. Id at 669-70, 517 P.2d at 1159-60, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 694-95.
30. Id
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these remaining causes of action, that is, for breach of oral promise and
conversion.3 ' The trial court, however, treated the jury verdict as advi-
sory only32 and entered its own findings of facts and conclusions of law
which adopted the jury's findings as to conversion only, but adopted
contrary findings as to Gilbralter's breach of oral promise not to sell the
property.33 The court thereafter entered judgment for the plaintiffs in
the amount of $14,000 which was found by the jury to constitute com-
pensatory damages for the conversion of plaintiffs' personal property.34
Plaintiffs appealed after the trial court denied their motions for a new
trial and to set aside the court's judgment.35 On appeal, the California
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling that treated the jury
verdict as advisory only.36 However, instead of applying the historical
analysis articulated in One Chevrolet and focusing on the "gist of the
action," the court focused on the nature of the relief sought to deter-
mine if the cause of action was legal or equitable in nature. "As the
relief sought in both causes of action was damages, and as the legal or
equitable nature of a cause of action ordinarily is determined by the
mode of relief to be afforded. . . plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial
as a matter of right."' 37 The court did not examine the English common
law at the time the California Constitution was adopted nor did they
examine the nature of the rights involved to determine if the "gist of
the action" was legal or equitable in nature.38 Instead, by focusing on
the mode of relief to be afforded, i.e., damages, the court appeared to
be formulating a new test to be applied.
Shortly after the California Supreme Court decided Raedeke, it
handed down its decision in C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber
Steel Company.39 C & KEngineering concerned an action for damages
arising from a breach of contract.40 Plaintiffs theory for recovery was
based upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel.4 Instead of focusing
on the mode of relief to be afforded in determining the nature of the
action as they had in Raedeke, the court declined to develop the






36. Id at 672, 517 P.2d at 1160-61, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97.
37. Id (emphasis added).
38. See People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 299, 231 P.2d 832, 843-44
(1951).
39. 23 Cal. 3d 1, 587 P.2d 1136, 151 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1978).
40. Id at 5, 587 P.2d at 1137, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
41. Id
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One Chevrolet.42 The court held that although the legal or equitable
nature of a cause of action is ordinarily determined by the mode of
relief to be afforded, the prayer for relief in a particular case is not
conclusive.43 Therefore, reasoned the court, the fact that damages may
be a possible remedy does not guarantee the right to a jury trial.44
The decision in C & K Engineering failed to remove the confusion
created by Raedeke, however. Instead of overruling Raedeke when
given the opportunity to do so, the court merely assimilated its ration-
ale by adopting the "mode of relief" prayed for as a factor to be consid-
ered when applying the "gist of the action" test of One Chevrolet.45 In
any event, the court did apply the historical test by examining the Eng-
lish common law at the time the constitution was adopted in determin-
ing that the gist of an action based upon the doctrine of promissory
estoppel is historically equitable in nature and therefore not to be tried
to a jury as a matter of right even though the mode of relief to be
afforded, damages, was in form legal. 6
Although at first glance there appears to be some authority that in-
surance coverage declaratory relief actions are triable to a jury in Cali-
fornia, the California Supreme Court has not, in fact, squarely decided
the issue. In State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Company v. Su-
perior Court,47 the California Supreme Court used strong obiter dicta
by citing what appears to be the majority rule that issues of fact which
would have been triable by jury as a matter of right in an action which
might have been substituted for declaratory relief are likewise triable
by jury as a matter of right in the action for declaratory relief.48 The
court in State Farm indicates, however, that the petitioner was not
challenging the propriety of respondent's right to a jury trial in the de-
claratory relief action.49 Therefore, the issue was not properly before
the court. Nor does the court specifically identify the particular action
at law replaced by the declaratory relief action when it applied the ma-
jority rule.50 The identity of the fundamental action at law is essential
in determining whether a trial by jury in a declaratory relief action is a
42. Id at 9, 587 P.2d at 1140, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
43. Id
44. Id
45. After citing the "gist of the action" test set forth in One Chevrolet, the C & KEngineering
decision went on to add:
"On the other hand, if the action is essentially one in equity and the relief sought 'depends upon
the application of equitable doctrines,' the parties are not entitled to a jury trial." Id at 9, 587
P.2d at 1140, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
46. Id at 10-11, 587 P.2d at 1141, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
47. 47 Cal. 2d 428, 304 P.2d 13 (1956).
48. Id at 431, 304 P.2d at 15.
49. Id
50. Id
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matter of right under the majority rule.5  The State Farm decision
does state, however, that "courts will not permit the declaratory action
to be used as a device to circumvent the right to a jury trial in cases
where such right would be guaranteed if the proceeding were coercive
rather than declaratory in nature." 52 Apparently, because the issue of
whether a right to a jury trial existed in insurance coverage declaratory
relief actions was not squarely before the court, it did not examine the
right to a jury in insurance coverage litigation as it existed in the Eng-
lish common law at the time the constitution was adopted in 1850.53
Therefore, the historical inquiry as to the gist of the action mandated
by One Chevrolet was not used by the court to determine if a right to a
jury exists in declaratory relief actions involving insurance coverage
disputes. However, this has not stopped the appellate courts from cit-
ing State Farm for the proposition that trial by jury is a matter of right
in such situations.
The first appellate court to cite State Farm as establishing a constitu-
tional right to a jury in insurance coverage declaratory relief actions
was Allstate Insurance Company v. The Normandie Club." In Allstate,
the plaintiff insurer sued its insured and other parties in declaratory
relief seeking a declaration that the plaintiff's policy of insurance did
not afford coverage for the underlying damage suit and that plaintiff,
therefore, did not owe its insured a duty to defend the damage suit.
5 5
Citing State Farm, the court held that a jury trial was a matter of con-
stitutional right "since the present case is one in which an action for
declaratory relief has been substituted for an action at law for breach of
contract . *... -5 As already explained, State Farm did not identify
the specific action at law replaced by insurance coverage declaratory
relief actions. In addition, Allstate cites no other authority for this
conclusion. 8 The truth of the matter is that neither Allstate, nor the
State Farm opinion cited by the Allstate court, followed the historical
approach mandated by the California Supreme Court in determining
whether the gist of an action for declaratory relief involving insurance
coverage was legal or equitable in accordance with the test set forth
with One Chevrolet 9.5  The court simply concluded, presumably on the
51. Id
52. Id at 432, 304 P.2d at 15.
53. Id at 431, 304 P.2d at 15.
54. 221 Cal. App. 2d 103, 34 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1963).
55. Id at 105, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
56. Id at 105-06, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 281-82 (emphasis added).
57. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d 428, 431-32, 304 P.2d
13, 15 (1956).
58. 221 Cal. App. 2d at 105-06, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 281-82.
59. See People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 286-87, 299, 231 P.2d 832, 835,
843-44 (1951).
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basis of the dicta in State Farm, that an insurance coverage declaratory
relief action was a substitute for an action at law for breach of contract
and, therefore, a jury trial was a matter of right under the majority rule
articulated by the State Farm decision.60
The court's conclusion in Allstate that an insurance coverage declar-
atory relief action is a substitute for an action at law for breach of con-
tract is not well founded. Actions at law are generally for damages,
61
while an action in declaratory relief seeks, in this situation at least, only
a declaration of non-coverage. It is hard to comprehend the situation
where an insured could be liable in damages to his insurer for suffering
an occurrence, 62 or non-occurrence as contended by the insurer, as de-
fined by the insurance contract.63 An occurrence is defined as "an acci-
dent, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during
the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected
nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."'  Although we have
chosen to use the word "occurrence" in our discussion, a word ordina-
rily used in comprehensive liability insurance policies, the same princi-
ples apply to all other loss events in other types of policies.
Insurance coverage disputes usually involve the non-performance of
a condition to the insurance contract excusing performance by the in-
surer from its promise to defend and indemnify the insured. 65  A
breach of contract, on the other hand, usually involves the unjustified
failure to perform a material promise or covenant.6 6 Nowhere in the
standard liability policy does the insured promise not to suffer an oc-
currence giving rise to liability on behalf of the insurer.67 For a court
to interpret an insurance contract as containing such a covenant by the
insured would be ludicrous. The express intent of the parties is mani-
fested in the general insuring provisions of the policy which provide
that the insurer promises to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which
60. 221 Cal. App. 2d at 105-06, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 281-82; see 47 Cal. 2d at 431-32, 304 P.2d at
15; 13 A.L.R.2d 777, 778.
61. C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 23 Cal. 2d 1, 9,587 P.2d 1136, 1140,
151 Cal. Rptr. 323, 327 (1978).
62. A standard insuring clause for a liability insurance policy usually provides the following:
The Company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of
A. bodily injury or
B. property damage to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence .... R. KEE-
TON, BASIc TExT ON INSURANCE LAW 658 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KEETON].
63. For specimen policy language setting forth the insured's obligations under an insurance
contract, see KEETON, supra note 62, at 655 (general liability-automobile policy), 663 (family com-
bination-automobile policy) (1971). These examples are illustrative of insurance policies in
general.
64. See KEETON, supra note 62, at 654.
65. See B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Contracts, §560, at 478 (8th ed. 1973).
66. See id §616, at 525.
67. See KEETON, supra note 61, at 663.
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the insured shall become legally obligated to pay to third persons by
reason of an occurrence and as long as coverage is not expressly ex-
cluded.68 Instead of the declaratory relief action being a substitute for
a breach of contract action, insurance coverage actions seek a declara-
tion from the court construing the insurance contract to determine the
rights and liabilities of the parties before a breach occurs. 69 Therefore,
the court's holding inAllstate that insurance coverage declaratory relief
actions are substitutes for breach of contract actions at law is not based
upon sound legal principles.
The confusion caused by the holding in Allstate is compounded by
the fact that subsequent appellate court decisions readily followed its
conclusionary holding.70 If the court, however, would have answered
the historical question required to be answered by the One Chevrolet
decision in determining whether the gist of the action is legal or equita-
ble in nature, it is quite likely that a different result would have been
reached by the Allstate court and in those subsequent decisions based
on Allstate. Because the One Chevrolet decision requires an in depth
historical inquiry, we must examine closely the origins and develop-
ment of insurance law to determine if the common law had proper ju-
risdiction over insurance disputes.
THE HISTORY OF THE CONTRACT OF INSURANCE:
WHO HAS JURISDICTION?
The earliest traces of insurance date back to the ancient world.71
Some sources seem to indicate that primitive forms of insurance existed
as early as the third century before Christ.7 2 These early forms of in-
surance provided primarily funeral rites for the dead and in some in-
stances aid to the elderly and ill.73 This type of insurance was usually
sponsored by fraternal and benevolent societies such as the Roman
Collegia 4 and flourished among other cultures like the Egyptians, Chi-
68. See KEETON, supra note 61, at 658.
69. See California Union Ins. Co. v. Trinity River Land Co., 105 Cal. App. 3d 104, 110, 163
Cal. Rptr. 802, 806 (1980); CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §1060.
70. See Interinsurance Exch. v. Savior, 51 Cal. App. 3d 691, 694, 124 Cal. Rptr. 239, 240
(1975); Patterson v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 6 Cal. App. 3d 310,315-16, 85 Cal. Rptr. 665, 667-68
(1970); General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Whitmore, 235 Cal. App. 2d 670, 676, 45 Cal. Rptr. 556, 560
(1965).
71. See I G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW, 27-28 (2d ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited
as 1 COUCH]; J. PARK, A SYsTEM OF THE LAW OF MARINE INSURANCE i-xliil (2d ed. 1799) [here-
inafter cited as PARK]; E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 48 (2d ed. 1957) [hereinaf-
ter cited as PATTERSON]; W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 8 (3d ed. 1951)
[hereinafter cited as VANCE].
72. VANCE, supra note 71, at 8.
73. VANCE, supra note 71, at 8.
74. VANCE, supra note 71, at 9.
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nese and Hindus.75 The principles embodied in the Roman Collegia
eventually passed to the guilds flourishing in the merchantile centers of
medieval Europe and formed the foundations for what became known,
at a much later date, as life, accident and health insurance contracts.76
Perhaps, more important to the development of insurance law was the
custom by which merchants, transporting goods by sea, allocated the
risks which permeated this form of transportation.77 Therefore, as ex-
plained below, all insurance law has its origins in the development of
marine insurance and it is upon this type of early insurance that our
inquiry must focus.
The early beginning to what we know today as marine insurance ap-
pears to have been the ancient practice of "general average" contribu-
tion and later the bottomry and respondentia bonds. 78 When the goods
of one merchant were destroyed or sacrificed to save the remaining
merchandise in the ship, as when goods were jettisoned during a peril-
ous storm, the loss was made up by the proportionate or "general aver-
age" contributions from the owners of the other interests which were
benefited by the sacrifice.79 The custom of "general average" served as
a device for the equitable allocation and distribution of the loss among
all the adventurers in the merchantile enterprise.8"
In addition to "general average" contribution, early merchants used
bottomry and respondentia bonds. The bottomry bond was ordinarily
evidence of a loan made to a merchant repayable only if the vessel
upon whose bottom the bond was secured completed the contemplated
voyage safely." Thus, if the goods financed by the loan failed to arrive
at the destined port, the merchant was sheltered from the loss by the
bottomry bond. Instead of assessing a premium, the lender in a bot-
tomry bond transaction was allowed to charge a higher rate of interest
to compensate him for the risk of losing his loan. 2 When and if the
vessel was lost, the owner of the vessel was not indemnified for the loss,
but instead received a discharge from payment on the loan. 3 The
respondentia bond was similar to the bottomry bond except it was se-
cured upon the cargo instead of the vessel bottom thereby protecting
individual merchants from loss sustained to their particular goods
while enroute even though the vessel itself may arrive safely at its
75. PATTERSON, supra note 71, at 48; VANCE, supra note 71, at 9.
76. VANcE, supra note 71, at 9.
77. VANCE, supra note 71, at 9. See generally PARK, supra note 71, at i-xliii.78. VANCa, supra note 71, at 9.
79. VANcn, supra note 71, at 9.
79. VANCE, supra note 71, at 9.
81. VANcE, supra note 71, at 9.
82. VANc8, supra note 71, at 9.
83. VANc, supra note 71, at 9.
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destination.84
The practice of respondentia and bottomry bonding was perfected by
the Rhodian merchants in the Mediterranean World and is commonly
identified as the direct origin of the law of marine insurance, the earli-
est form of insurance law.85 All insurance law developed from this
common origin. From the twelfth to sixteenth centuries, the republics
of northern Italy flourished on their maritime commerce.86 Therefore,
it is not surprising that most of the early documentation concerning
commercial insurance comes from Italian sources. The earliest insur-
ance policy known to have been in standard form originated in Genoa
in 1347.87 This was soon followed by a statutorily prescribed form pol-
icy enacted in Florence in 1523.88 From Italy the custom of making
mutual contracts of insurance rapidly spread throughout the commer-
cial centers of Europe, eventually to be centered in the merchant orga-
nizations forming the Hansaetic League.89 The insurance contract
became known as a "policy" of insurance, being derived from the Ital-
ian word "poliza," which, according to etymological sources, traces
back to a Greek word meaning a folded writing.90
During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the making of insur-
ance contracts became a firmly rooted commercial custom among
merchants throughout all the maritime states of Europe.91 Because the
practice of making insurance contracts was limited primarily, if not ex-
clusively, to insuring the transportation of goods in international com-
merce, a need for uniformity of rules governing insurance contracts, as
well as other international commercial contracts, existed in the com-
mercial community.92 Therefore, in response to the need for uniform-
ity in commercial contracts, insurance law, as well as other commercial
rules, took on an international character eventually giving rise to a
whole body of rules which became known as the "law merchant.
'93
This body of commercial rules is said to have borne a peculiar rela-
tion to the respective systems of law existing within the several coun-
tries where international commerce was prevalent.9 4 All controversies
involving commercial transactions, including insurance matters, were
84. VANCE, supra note 71, at 9.
85. VANca, supra note 71, at 10.
86. VANcE, supra note 71, at 10.
87. VANCE, supra note 71, at 11.
88. VANcE, supra note 71, at 11.
89. VY cF, supra note 71, at 11.
90. VY c, supra note 71, at 11.
91. VANcE, supra note 71, at 11.
92. VANc, supra note 71, at 11.
93. VANCE, supra note 71, at 11.
94. VANCE, supra note 71, at 11.
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decided in accordance with the "law merchant" apparently to the ex-
clusion of local law.95 Professor Vance in his work on insurance ex-
plains this phenomenon in the following manner:
During the Middle Ages these merchants engaged in international
commerce, being much more enlightened than most of their country-
men, and better capable of governing their own trade, were naturally
unwilling to leave the determining of their rights with respect to such
trade to the crude forms of law and the rude courts that administered
the local laws of Continental Europe. From this fact arose the cus-
tom among these merchants of leaving all questions arising under the
law merchant to be settled by conventional courts established by
themselves, and having only such powers as were derived from the
consent of the parties appearing before them. Nevertheless, these in-
formal tribunals of merchants which were, in effect, but committees
of arbitration, and which had no means of enforcing directly any
order that might be entered, were by the mere force of custom ena-
bled to settle satisfactorily all causes arising out of the law merchant
during those centuries.96
From the above paragraphs tracing the origins of insurance, it can be
said with certainty that insurance law originated with and was devel-
oped by the merchants of Europe and was finally embodied in the cus-
toms and rules commonly known as the "law merchant."97 As
discussed below, in fact, it was through the medium of the "law
merchant" that insurance was introduced into England.98
As early as the twelfth century, Italian merchants from Northern It-
aly, commonly known as Lombards, established trading houses in
London and introduced into English trade the merchantile customs
known as the "law merchant." 99 The Lombards brought with them not
only the Italian custom of insuring against the hazards of trade, but
also their custom of submitting all controversies arising under
merchantile transactions to courts of merchants, established by them-
selves, having no relation to or sanction from the common law courts of
England.' °° Apparently, these merchant courts were adequate tribu-
nals for several centuries until, in 1601, Parliament enacted the Statute
of Assurances °10 establishing a court of special jurisdiction modeled af-
ter the customary conventional courts of the merchants."°2
95. VANcn, supra note 71, at 11.
96. VANCE, supra note 71, at 11-12.
97. 1 CoucH, supra note 71, at 28; VANCE, supra note 71, at 11; see PARK, supra note 71, i-
xliii.
98. VANCE, supra note 71, at 14.
99. VANcE, supra note 71, at 14.
100. VANcE, supra note 71, at 14.
101. An Acte concerninge matters of Assurances, amongste Merchantes, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 12.
102. VANCE, supra note 71, at 14.
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The first statute enacted by the English Parliament which recognized
the practice of insurance was the Statute of Assurances, 43 Eliz. c. 12,
formally entitled '4n Acte concerninge matters ofAssurances, amongste
Merchantes."'1 3 This statute was enacted to provide a more efficient
103. The following is the text to the Statute of Assurances, officially titled "An Acte concern-
inge matters of Assurances, amongste Merchantes." The reader is reminded that the inconsisten-
cies in spelling are in the original text of the statute.
Whereas it ever hathe bene the Policie of this Realme by all good meanes to comforte
and encourage the Merchante, therebie to advance and increase the generall wealthe of
the Realme, her Majesties Customes and the strengthe of Shippinge, which Consider-
acon is nowe the more requisite, because Trade and Traffique is not at this psente soe
open as at other tymes it hathe bene: And whereas it hathe bene tyme out of mynde an
usage amongste Merchantes, both of this Realme and of forraine Nacyons, when they
made any greate adventure (speciallie into remote partes) to give some consideration of
Money to other psons (shich comonlie are in noe small number) to have from them
assurance made of their Goodes Merchandizes Ships and Things adventured, or some
parte thereof, at such rates and is such sorte as the Parties assurers and the Parties as-
sured can agree, which course of dealinge is comonly termed a Policie of Assurance; by
meanes of whiche Policies of Assurance it comehte to passe, upon the losse or perishinge
of any Shippe there followeth not the undoinge of anyMan, but the losse lightethe rather
easilie upon many, then heavilie upon fewe, and rather upon them that adventure not
then those that doe adventure, whereby all Merchantes, spiallie the yonger sorte, are
allured to venture more willinglie and more freelie: And whereas heretofore suche As-
surers have used to stande so justlie and pciselie upon their credites, as fewe or no Con-
trovsies have risen thereupon, and if any have growen the same have from tyme to tyme
bene ended and ordered by certaine grave and discreete Merchantes, apponted by the
Lorde Mayor of the Citie of London, as Men by reason of their experience fitteste to
understande, and speedilie to decide those Causes; untill of late yeeres that divers psons
have withdrawen themselves from that arbitrarie course, and have soughte to drawe the
parties assured to seek their moneys of everie seerall Assurer, by Suites comenced in her
Majesties Courtes, to their greate charges and delayes: For Remedie whereof be it en-
acted by the authoritie of this psente Parliamente, That it shall and may be lawfull for
the Lorde Chauncellor, or Lorde Keeper of the Great Seale of Englande for the tyme
beinge, to awarde foorthe under the Greate Seale of England, one generall or standinge
Comyssion, to be renewed yeerelie at the leaste and otherwise soe ofte as unto the saide
Lorde Chancellor or Lorde Keeper shall seeme good, for the Hearinge and
determynynge of Causes arisinge, and Pollicies of Assurances, suche as now are or here-
after shall be entred within the office of Assurances within the Citie of London, and
whereof no Suite shalbe dependinge the laste day of this Session of Parliamente in any of
her Majesties Courtes; whiche Commission shallbe directed unto the Judge of the Ad-
miraltie for the tyme beinge, the Recorder of London for the time beinge, two Doctors of
the Civil Lawe, and two comon Lawyers, and eighte grave and discrete Merchantes, or
any five of them; whiche Comyssioners, or the greater parte of them, whiche shall sit and
meete, shall have by vertue of this psent Acte full power and aucthoritie to heare ex-
amyne order and decree all and everie suche cause and causes concemynge Policies of
Assurances, in a briefe and sumarie course, as to theire discrecon shall seeme meete,
withoute formalities of Pleading or Pceeding.
And be it further enacted by the authoritie aforesaide, That it shall be lawfull for the
saide Comyssioners, as well to warne any of the parties to come before them as alsoe to
examyne upon Oathe any Wines that shalbe pduced, and to comytt toprison without
Baile or Maineprise, any pson that shall wilfullie conteme or disobey their fynall Or-ders or Decrees; And that the saide Comyssioners shall once everie weeke at the leaste
mete and sit upon the execucon of the salde Comission in the Office of the Assurances,
or in some other convenient publike place by them to be assigned; and that no psone by
vertue of this Acte may clayme or exact any Fee for any matter or cuase concernynge theexecucon of the saide Comyssion.
And be it further enacted by the athoritie aforesaide, That if any psone shall begrieved by Sentence or Decree of the salde Comissioners, that suche pson so grievedmay, at any tyme within two monethes of the saide Decree r made, exhibite his Billinto the H-Iighe Courte of Chaunerie for the re-exaiaon of such Decree; sue as everiepson Complaynante, before hee shall exhibite any suche Bill, doe either execute and
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process for adjudicating insurance matters. The preamble to the Stat-
ute of Assurances provides some enlightening information concerning
the history of insurance in England. From the preamble, one can de-
duce that the practice of making insurance contracts among merchants
was firmly established by 1601:
And whereas it hathe bene tyme out of mynde an usage amonge
Merchantes, both of this Realme and of forraine Nacyons, when they
make any greate adventure (speciallie into remote partes) to give
some consideracion of Money to other persons (which comonlie are
in noe small number) to have from them assurance made of their
Goodes Merchandizes Ships and Things adventured, or some parte
thereof, at suche rates and in such sorte as the Parties assureres and
the Parties assured can agree, whiche course of dealinge is commonly
termed a Policie of Assurance; by means of whiche Policies of Assur-
ance it comethe to passe, upon the losse or perishinge of any Shippe
there followethee not the undoinge of any Man, but the losse
lightethe rather easilie upon many, than heavilie upon fewe. .... 104
Apparently, at the time this statute was written, the custom of writing
insurance contracts among English merchants had existed for centu-
ries.105 In addition, the customs and rules which made up the "law
merchant" were familiar to the members of Parliament who enacted
the Statute of Assurances. 1 6 In fact, by creating a special court for
"policies of assurance," it appears that the intent of Parliament was to
legitimize and sanctify the conventional courts established by the
merchants.
The preamble goes on to recite that in the past, the merchants were
successful in arbitrating any controversy arising under a policy of in-
surance in the merchantile courts. These merchant's courts were com-
satisfie the saide Sentence soe awarded, or at leaste lay downe, in deposito withe the said
Commissioners, such sumes of money as he shall be awarded to pay, and that upon soe
doyinge the saide Complaynante shalbe enlarged of his Imprisonmente; and that the
Lorde Chauncellor or Lorde Keeper for the tyme beinge shall have full power and
authoritie, by vertue of this Acte, upon everie Complainte made (in order as aforesaide)
to reverse or affme everie suche Sentence or Decree accordinge to Equitie and Con-
science; And that saide Lorde Chauncellor or Lorde Keeper, in everie suche Suite
broughte before hym as aforesaide by such Assurers, and decreede against the saide
Assurers, shall be awarde double Costes to the partie assured.
Provided nevtheles, That noe Comyssioner shall intermeddle in the execucon of any
suche Comission, in any cause or matter of Assurance shere hymselfe shalbe either a
partie assurer, or assured, in the ame Assurance whiche is broughte in question; nor that
any Comyssioner, (other then the saide Judge of the Admiraltie and the Recorder of
London,) shall deale or pcede in the execucon of any suche Comission before he have
taken his Corporall Oathe, before the Lorde Mayor and Courte of Aldermen of the Citie
of London, to pcede uprightlie and indifferentlie betwene partie and partie.
104. 43 Eliz., c. 12 (1601). See note 103 supra.
105. 43 Eliz., c. 12 (1601) "it hathe bene tyme out of mynde an usage amonge Merchantes
106. Id
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prised of "certaine grave and discreete Merchantes," whose
"experience fitteste to understande, and speedilie to decide those
Causes . ... 107 Eventually, however, it became increasingly the
practice of some to avoid the merchant courts by bringing actions in the
royal courts.10 8 This practice resulted in great expense to the parties
and burdensome delays in deciding the rights of the litigants. 0 9 To
remedy this situation, Parliament enacted the Statute of Assurances
which created a court of special jurisdiction to decide matters relating
to insurance contracts. 110 This court of special jurisdiction was com-
prised of "the Judge of the Admiraltie for the tyme beinge, the Re-
corder of London for the tyme beinge, two Doctors of the Civil Lawe,
and two common lawyers, and eighte grave and discrete Merchantes
"lll
The court of special jurisdiction was in essence a commission and the
members of the court were commissioners who served for a term of one
year, any five of which could convene the court and decide controver-
sies brought before it.l1 2 The court was empowered to decide cases
without formalities of pleading and procedure." 3 This served to elimi-
nate the unnecessary delay and expense which existed in the royal
courts. In addition, the court had authority to subpeona witnesses, ex-
amine them under oath, and imprison persons for contempt. 14 The
most enlightening historical fact of this statutory scheme that created
this court of special jurisdiction is that jurisdiction on appeal did not
exist in the common law courts, but was vested in equity with an appeal
to the "Highe Courte of Chauncerie" to be decided "according to Equi-
"1115tie and Conscience ....
The insurance court established by the Statute of Assurances was
empowered only to act in personam and was without power to act in
rem. 116 This proved to be a severe hinderance to the effectiveness of
the insurance court."17 Moreover, because the commissioners were re-
quired to take an oath before both the Lord Mayor of London and the
"Courte of Aldermen of the Citie of London," and because the Court
of Aldermen did not meet every year, many of the commissioners were










116. Id;see PARK, supra note 71, at xlv.
117. 43 Eliz., c. 12 (1601).
1982 / Right to Jury Trials
not be sworn in."l8 An additional hinderance to the insurance court
was that a burdensome total of five commissioners was required to con-
vene the court and decide cases." 19 These problems were addressed by
Parliament in an amendment to the Statute of Assurances enacted in
1662 entitled "An Additional Act concerning matters of Assurances
used amongst Merchants."'1
20
The amendment empowered the court to act in rem against the ship
and/or goods of the parties, 21 required the oath of office to be admin-
istered only by the Lord Mayor of London who was readily avail-
able, 22 and reduced the number of commissioners required to convene
the court from five to three, one of which must be either a Doctor of the
Civil Law or a Barrister at Law of five years experience.1 23 Finally,
Parliament was careful to make explicitly clear that the "appeal to the
High Court of Chancery" was to be preserved.1 24 In summary, from
the Statute of Assurances and its subsequent amendment, one may con-
clude that Parliament sanctified the conventional courts of the
Merchants, which had originated in the "law merchant," and deter-mined that the ultimate rules of law to govern insurance contracts were
those of Chancery and not those of the common law.
The moving force behind the enactment of the Statute of Assurances
was the fact that the common law courts with their formal rules of
pleading and procedure were entirely inadequate tribunals for deciding
insurance cases.' 25 As recited in the preamble to the Statute of Assur-
ances, actions on policies of insurance brought in the common law
courts resulted in unnecessary delay and expense. 26 In addition, com-
mon law principles were inadequate to decide insurance cases because
insurance contracts were not made according to the requisites of the
common law, but instead were negotiated pursuant to merchantile cus-
toms embodied in the "law merchant." 27 It was not until the appoint-
ment of Lord Mansfield as Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench
in 1756 that any recognition of merchant customs is seen in the courts
of common law.
12 8
Lord Mansfield, who is often referred to as the "Father of English
118. Id
119. Id See note 103 supra.
120. An Additional Act concerning matters of Assurance used amongst Merchants, 1662, 14





125. VANCE, supra note 71, at 15.
126. 43 Eliz., c. 12 (1601); 14 Car. 2, c. 23 (1662).
127. VANCE, supra note 71, at 15-16.
128. VANCE, supra note 71, at 16.
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Commercial Law,"' 129 recognized the peculiar circumstances which at-
tended the making of commercial contracts and the importance of rec-
ognizing and considering merchantile customs when determining the
rights of the parties to a commercial contract.130 In an effort to make
the common law courts suitable for determining rights under merchan-
tile contracts, Lord Mansfield attempted to fuse English common law
and the "law merchant" into one body of law. 3' More significantly,
perhaps, is the fact that Lord Mansfield impaneled special juries of
merchants to determine the rules and customs of English merchants.11
2
Therefore, even Lord Mansfield recognized that the common law jury
was an inappropriate trier of fact in certain commercial contexts which
may have included insurance cases.
Blackstone describes the usual insurance case as being "determined
by the verdict of a jury of merchants, and the opinion of the judges in
case of any legal doubts; whereby the decision is more speedy, satisfac-
tory, and final. .. . Although Blackstone recognized the validity
of the Statute of Assurances, he pointed out that "no such commission
has of late years issued." 134 Apparently, several common law court de-
cisions interpreting the Statute of Assurances limited its effectiveness in
deciding insurance cases.'
35
Mr. Justice Park, a contemporary legal scholar, in his work on insur-
ance gives the following reasons for the decline of the courts of special
jurisdiction created by the Statute of Assurances. First, Park posits that
the statutory jurisdiction, being limited to policies of insurance re-
corded in London, was not extensive enough to serve the needs of the
merchants involved in commerce.1 36 This reason, however, is not per-
suasive. Although the exact ratio of insurance policies written in
London to those written in other cities is not known, what is known is
that the insurance business in London, with the legendary Lombard
Street and Lloyds Coffee House, certainly dominated the industry and
would have accounted for a considerable amount of litigation regard-
ing insurance claims.' 37 Second, Park indicates that some court deci-
sions strictly construed the Statute of Assurances by holding that the
insurance courts only had jurisdiction over insurance contracts relating
129. VANCE, supra note 71, at 16.
130. VANce, supra note 71, at 16.
131. VANCE, supra note 71, at 16.
132. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIms 75 (Ist ed. 1769) [hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE];
VANCE, supra note 71, at 16.
133. BLACKSTONE, supra note 132, at 75.
134. BL CKSTONE, supra note 132, at 75.
135. See PARK, supra note 71, at xlv-xlvi.
136. PARK, supra note 71, at xlv-xlvi.
137. See VANCE, supra note 71, at 17-18.
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to merchandise. 1 3 Third, other court decisions restricted the powers of
the insurance courts further by holding that they could only entertain
actions brought by insureds, and not actions brought by insurers.
139
These decisions appear to be in direct conflict with the language of the
statute and should be viewed with caution.1" As Park points out, how-
ever, the most convincing reason the insurance courts lost their utility
was because subsequent court decisions held that bringing an action in
the insurance court pursuant to the Statute of Assurances was not a bar
to litigating the same cause of action in the royal courts. 141 These deci-
sions deprived insurance court judgments of finality and thus created
the delay and expense Parliament sought to eliminate by enacting the
Statute of Assurances.142
It is extremely important, however, to note that the Statute of Assur-
ances as subsequently amended was not repealed by Parliament until
1863, long after these decisions restricted the efficacy of the courts it
created.1 43 Furthermore, despite the insurance court's perfunctory sta-
tus, scarcely 60 cases are reported in the official reporters involving in-
surance disputes in the intervening century between the enactment of
the Statute of Assurances in 1601 and the appointment of Lord Mans-
field as Chief Justice of King's Bench in 1756.144 Moreover, the major-
ity of these decisions are general verdicts or short opinions of a single
judge which do not clearly indicate what was happening in the devel-
opment of insurance law, if anything. 145 Whether the common law had
jurisdiction in all insurance cases is, at best, unclear during the period
immediately proceeding the appointment of Lord Mansfield as Chief
Justice. It is more likely that once the insurance courts created by Par-
liament failed, merchants continued to settle insurance cases in their
own conventional courts.
14 6
The history and development of insurance helps us to understand its
nature. As already discussed, the focal point in history which deter-
mines if a right to jury trial exists in California is the year 1850, that
being the year the California Constitution was adopted.147 If the gist of
the action is essentially legal in nature, then there is a constitutional
right to a jury trial.148 If the gist of the action is not legal, for example,
138. PARK, supra note 71, at xlv-xlvi.
139. PARK, supra note 71, at xlv-xlvi.
140. 43 Eliz., c. 12 (1601). See note 103 supra.
141. PARK, supra note 71, at xlv-xlvi.
142. PARK, supra note 71, at xlv-xlvi.
143. See generally CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE AND INDEX TO STATUTES (9th ed. 1884).
144. PAMK, supra note 71, at xlviii.
145. PARK, supra note 71, at xlviii.
146. VANCE, supra note 71, at 16.
147. See notes 20-26 and accompanying text supra.
148. People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 299, 231 P.2d. 832, 843-44 (1951).
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an action in equity or possibly one in admiralty, then there is no right
to a jury trial.
1 49
At this point, it is necessary to emphasize one important fact to avoid
confusion to the reader. Modem liability insurance did not in fact exist
in 1850. In understanding this statement, certain definitions may be
helpful. Generally, insurance is a contract by which one party, for
compensation, assumes particular risks of the other party and promises
to pay to him or his nominee a certain or ascertainable sum of money
on a specified contingency.'50 Liability insurance is a contract of in-
demnity for the benefit of the insured and those in privity with him
obligating the insurer to indemnify the insured for damages which the
insured becomes legally obligated to pay to another and within the cov-
erage of the policy provided by the insurer. 5' Liability insurance is
essentially an outgrowth of the increase in personal injury litigation
that occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 152
The first liability insurance case reported in the United States was
not until 1892, some forty-two years after the California Constitution
was adopted. 53 Although the exact year liability insurance premiered
in the United States is unknown, it is very unlikely that it was much
earlier than the date of its first reported case. Liability insurance, as
with all other insurance except possibly life insurance, evolved from the
same body of law, that is the "law merchant," as did marine insurance
discussed above. 154 As Couch so aptly explains, "undoubtedly the first
forms of legal expression in insurance concerned marine law and
marine insurance, and it is to this branch of the law that one must look
for the early formulations and development of the principles governing
the contract of insurance."'
' 5 5
Although fire insurance, a type of property insurance, existed in Eng-
land prior to 1850, it was not until 1869 that it was accepted as consis-
tent with public policy and encouraged. 56 Therefore, as with liability
149. Id
150. See 43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance §1, at 62 (1969).
151. See id, §2, at 65.
152. Employers Liab. Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 155 Mass. 404, 406, 29 N.E. 529, 531 (1892).
The invention of accident insurance preceded the recent flood of actions of tort for personal
injuries, and the only risk from accidents to the person then commonly thought of as a factor in
ordinary life was the risk of injury to one's own person. Such insurance grew popular, was after-
wards seen to be too costly for general use, and was abandoned by most of the companies which
engaged in the business. But when it came to be understood that every man engaged in business,
and every owner or lessee of business property, was exposed to heavy losses from accidents to the
persons of others, the chance of which no prudent man could afford to ignore, a new demand for
accident insurance against personal injuries arose, which was the legitimate function of accident
insurance companies to meet.
153. See id
154. 1 COUCH, supra note 71, at 28.
155. 1 COUCH, supra note 71, at 28.
156. VANCE, supra note 71, at 19-20.
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insurance, fire insurance had not yet fully developed by 1850. Prior to
1869, fire insurance in England was held to be contrary to public policy
in that it encouraged arson. 157 Parliament attempted to hinder the de-
velopment of fire insurance with burdensome taxes and the courts
viewed a policy of fire insurance with ardent disfavor. 5 ' It was not
until the last half of the nineteenth century, when England recognized
that fire insurance was highly beneficial to property interest, that fire
insurance spread with rapidity.'59 Because liability and fire insurance
had not yet developed beyond their infancy at the time the California
Constitution was adopted, it is through historical necessity that the de-
termination of whether a right to a jury in insurance coverage declara-
tory relief actions depends on whether the gist of action on a marine
insurance policy is legal in nature, or, in other words, whether it was
cognizable at common law.1
60
The issue of whether an action on a marine insurance policy was
cognizable at common law has been addressed by the United States
Supreme Court. Although decisions of the United States Supreme
Court concerning the right to a civil jury trial are not binding on Cali-
fornia courts, they are persuasive. In 1870, the United States Supreme
Court was called upon to decide whether the common law courts of
England had jurisdiction over insurance contracts in New EnglandMu-
tual Marine Insurance Company v. Dunham. 6' In Dunham, the admi-
ralty jurisdiction of the federal court sitting in the District of
Massachusetts was challenged in a action on an insurance contract on
the theory that jurisdiction was properly in the courts of law. 162 The
appellant argued that if jurisdiction for an action on an insurance con-
tract was not found to be in the courts of law, then appellant's right to a
jury trial protected by the seventh amendment to the United States
Constitution would be violated.' 63 The Dunham court was not per-
suaded by the appellant's contention that his right to a jury trial would
be violated if insurance cases were decided in admiralty. The key issue
for our present discussion decided by the Court was that the common
law courts of England did not have jurisdiction over insurance con-
tracts; and, that therefore, by implication, no right to a jury trial in an
insurance contract dispute was preserved by the seventh amendment.'"
157. VANcF, supra note 71, at 19-20.
158. VANCE, supra note 71, at 19-20.
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[I]t is well known that the contract of insurance sprang from the law
maritime, and derives all its material rules and incidents therefrom.
It was unknown to the common law; and the common law remedies,
when applied to it, were so inadequate and clumsy that disputes aris-
ing out of the contract were generally left to arbitration, until the
year A.D. 1601, when the statute of 43 Elizabeth was passed creating
a special court, or commission, for hearing and determining causes
arising on policies of insurance.
1 65
In addition, the Court in Dunham pointed out that even after the
common law courts in England attempted to wrestle jurisdiction over
insurance contracts away from admiralty and the insurance courts, the
contemporary scholar Sir W.D. Evans remarked "the inadequacy of
the existing law to settle,proprie vigore, complicated questions of aver-
age and contribution, is very manifest and notorious. Such questions
are, by consent, as matter of course, and from conviction of counsel
that justice cannot be attained in any other way, referred to private
examination."' 16 6 In other words, these disputes were presumably sub-
mitted to the arbitration of the conventional merchant courts. Finally,
the Court in Dunham concluded that the contract of insurance is an
"exotic in the common law" because the historical development of in-
surance was totally separate and distinct from the common law of
England.67
Applying the One Chevrolet test to the historical facts just
presented,1 68 it is reasonable to state that at the time the California
Constitution was adopted in 1850, the English common law courts did
not have jurisdiction over insurance cases. Despite the fact history sug-
gests otherwise, considering the fact that a breach by an insurance com-
pany of its policy of insurance has long been thought to give rise to a
cause of action for breach of contract, a traditional common law cause
of action to which there has always been a right to a jury trial, it is very
unlikely that any court entertaining an action on a policy against an
insurance company will hold that the insured is not entitled to trial by
jury. On the other hand, the strong policy in favor of jury trial in ac-
tions initiated by an insured against the insurer is not dispositive of the
issue when an action is brought by the insurer against the insured in
declaratory relief for a declaration of non-coverage. By recognizing
that an insurance contract is a unilateral and executory contract subject
to the condition precedent of either an occurrence or other stated con-
ditions, one can easily see that the insured owes no duty to perform on
165. Id
166. Id at 32.
167. Id
168. See notes 20-26 and accompanying text supra.
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the contract the failure of which can ever rise to an action at law for
breach of contract. As already discussed, an action for declaratory re-
lief is suigeneris, a creature of statute totally unknown to the common
law of England in 1850.169
In positing that actions on insurance policies were not properly the
subject of common law jurisdiction in England, the United States
Supreme Court in Dunham traced the historical development of insur-
ance and concluded that its history presented a separate and distinct
tradition from that of the English common law.170 Blackstone men-
tions that insurance contracts are based upon equitable principles
which are decided on a case by case basis. 171 Thus, jurisdiction in eq-
uity for a cause of action on an insurance contract is not without histor-
ical foundation.1 72 However, it may be more accurate to state that the
evidence which suggests that the courts of common law had proper ju-
risdiction over insurance causes is outweighed by evidence which sug-
gests that it did not, as in the case where jurisdiction should have been
in either equity, admiralty, or a court of special jurisdiction.
In determining if the English common law had jurisdiction of an ac-
tion in 1850, the California Supreme Court has held that the Acts of
Parliament are to be given great weight because "it is well established
in California that the common law of England includes not only the lex
non scr#pta but also the written statutes enacted by Parliament."1 73 As
pointed out above, Parliament in 1601174 recognized that the common
law courts were entirely inadequate in determining cases on insurance
contracts due to the unsophisticated state of the common law, great
expense and delay.1 75 Parliament enacted the Statute of Assurances
creating a court of special jurisdiction for insurance cases to remedy
this inadequacy.1 76 This statute was amended in 1662177 and was not
repealed by Parliament until 1863,171 long after the California Consti-
tution was adopted. Although the insurance courts created by the Stat-
ute of Assurances were relegated to a perfunctory status by subsequent
169. Patterson v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 6 Cal. App. 3d 310, 315-16, 85 Cal. Rptr. 665, 667-
68 (1970); Veale v. Piercy, 206 Cal. App. 2d 557, 560-61, 24 Cal. Rptr. 91, 93 (1962).
170. New England Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1, 32 (1870).
171. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMmENTARiES 461 (Ist ed. 1766).
172. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 636 (1924) [hereinafter cited as
HOLDSWORTH].
173. Moore v. Purse Seine Net, 18 Cal. 2d 835, 838, 118 P.2d 1, 4 (1941).
174. An Acte concerninge matters of Assurances, amongste Merchantes, 43 Eliz., c. 12 (1601).
See note 103 supra.
175. Id; VANcE, supra note 71, at 15.
176. 43 Eliz., c. 12 (1601). See note 103 supra.
177. An Additional Act concerning matters of Assurance used amongst Merchants, 14 Car. 2,
c. 23 (1662).
178. See generally CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE AND INDEX TO STATUTES (9th ed. 1884).
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court decisions,179 Blackstone was of the opinion that a trial in accord-
ance with the statute could still be had pursuant to the statute's
authority.1
8 0
At the very least, the Statute of Assurances is indicative of a Parli-
mentary intent not to vest jurisdiction over insurance contracts in the
common law courts.'' In debating the issue in Parliament, it was sug-
gested that original jurisdiction be given to Chancery. 8 2 However, Ba-
con tells us that Parliament declined to do so because a suit in
Chancery was "too long a course" and that the chancery courts "have
not the knowledge of their terms, neither can they tell what to say upon
their cases, which be secrets in their science, proceeding out of their
experience." 183 Therefore, Parliament eventually decided to create a
court of special jurisdiction modeled after the conventional merchant
courts of continental Europe.184 Although Parliament did not vest
Chancery with original jurisdiction, it did vest it with appellate juris-
diction to decide cases "according to Equitie and Conscience."1 85 The
Court in Dunham was of the opinion that this manifested an intent not
to vest jurisdiction in the common law courts. 86 Any argument that
the common law courts under Lord Coke effectively obtained jurisdic-
tion over insurance contracts was aptly rebutted by Justice Story's
opinion in De Lovio v. Boit'87 which was approved by the Dunham
court.18 8 The historical inquiry required by One Chevrolet, therefore,
suggests that jurisdiction over insurance cases was not vested in the
common law courts in 1850. Whether jurisdiction was vested in equity
or in admiralty is uncertain. However, for the purposes of this article,
the same conclusion follows.
CONCLUSION
The same problem exists today that existed in England in 1601. In
recent years, insurance companies have been forced to provide a condi-
tional defense to its insured to prevent the potential of bad faith liabil-
ity. This defense is ordinarily conditioned upon a full reservation of
rights by the insurer to seek a judicial declaration of non-coverage.
The litigation expenses of the underlying damage suit and the declara-
179. See PARK, supra note 71, at xlv.
180. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMmENTARiES 75 (lst ed. 1768).
181. New England Mar. Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1, 31 (1870).
182. 5 W. HOLDswORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 150 (1924).
183. Id
184. 43 Eliz., c. 12 (1601). See note 103 supra.
185. 43 Eliz., c. 12 (1601); 14 Car. 2, c. 23 (1662).
186. 78 U.S. at 31.
187. 7 F. Cas. 418 (D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776).
188. 78 U.S. at 35.
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tory relief action are ultimately passed on to the consumer in the nature
of higher premiums. In addition, the extra litigation adds to the ex-
isting problem of congested court calendars. In this respect, the ex-
pense to both the insured and the insurer for unnecessary litigation and
the burdensome delays experienced in England in 1601 exist in our
own modem society.
Unlike the British Parliament, however, the California Legislature
may not enact laws to remedy this problem if the legislation abridges
the constitutionally protected right to a jury trial. Any law enacted by
the legislature which infringes upon the constitutional right to trial by
jury is a nullity.18 9 Therefore, before the legislature is free to provide a
remedy, it is of paramount importance to determine if the California
Constitution protects the right to jury trial in insurance coverage
disputes.
This article has attempted to show that the historical evidence which
suggests that the common law in 1850 did not have jurisdiction over
causes of action arising under a policy of marine insurance outweighs
the historical evidence which suggests that it did. It is not the intent of
this article, however, to advocate the abrogation of all jury trials in
cases involving insurance contracts. The trend in the law seems to be
toward expanding the right to a jury trial, not towards constricting that
right. However, the policy reasons which support the right to a jury
trial when the insured sues an insurer for damages under a policy of
insurance are not as compelling when the insurer is suing its insured for
a declaration of its rights. In the latter case, no breach by the insurer
has yet occurred and the insurer is usually seeking an interpretation of
the insurance contract and a judicial declaration of its rights and obli-
gations pursuant to that interpretation. In the former case, a breach, if
any, has already occurred and the jury is called upon to determine the
facts constituting that breach and award damages commensurate with
it. While the historical evidence outlined in this article suggests that
the right to a jury trial in all insurance cases should not be protected by
the California Constitution, it is more realistic from a public policy
point of view, to say that, historically, insurance coverage declaratory
relief actions were not cognizable at common law in 1850 and, there-
fore, no right to a jury trial exists in insurance coverage declaratory
relief actions. In this way, the California Legislature would be free to
enact remedial legislation, possibly in the same spirit and tradition as
the British Parliament in 1601, to solve the problems of high insurance
189. People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 287, 231 P.2d 832, 835 (1951);
People v. Kelly, 203 Cal. 128, 133, 263 P. 226, 228 (1928).
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premiums and congested court calendars now presented by increasing
insurance coverage disputes.
One possible remedy the legislature could enact is to remove insur-
ance coverage disputes from the jurisdiction of the judiciary and vest
jurisdiction in an administrative agency, possibly modeled after the
Workers Compensation Appeals Board. 19 Such an "insurance cover-
age appeals board" with subordinate administrative tribunals would
benefit both the insurer and insured. An administrative hearing to de-
termine coverage issues by interpreting the insurance contract would
provide a more expedient determination of the rights and obligations of
the parties resulting in less litigation expense and delay which in turn
could be passed on to the consumer in the nature of lower insurance
premiums. Finally, by removing jurisdiction of insurance coverage is-
sues from the judiciary, court calendars would be less congested which
would speed up the final determination of other types of litigation. In
this respect, society as a whole would be better off.
190. See generally CAL. LAB. CODE §§3201-6002 (setting forth the statutory scheme imple-
menting the Workers Compensation insurance program).
